It is well-known that selling different goods in a single bundle can significantly increase revenue, even when the valuations for the goods are independent. However, bundling is no longer profitable if the goods have high production costs. To overcome this challenge, we introduce a new mechanism, Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC), where after buying the bundle, the customer is allowed to return any subset of goods for their production cost. We derive both distribution-dependent and distribution-free guarantees on its profitability, which improve previous techniques. Our distribution-dependent bound suggests that the firm should never price the bundle such that the profit margin is less than 1/3 of the expected welfare, while also showing that PBDC is optimal for a large number of independent goods. Our distribution-free bound suggests that on the distributions where PBDC performs worst, individual sales perform well. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations which confirm that PBDC outperforms other simple pricing schemes overall.
Introduction
We study the monopolist pricing problem of a firm selling n heterogeneous items. For each item, customers have a valuation, which is their maximum willingness-to-pay, drawn from a known distribution. A customer wants at most one of each item. The firm offers take-it-or-leave-it prices for every subset of items, and the customer chooses the subset maximizing her surplus (valuation for the subset minus price), with the no-purchase option always being available. We assume the customer's valuation for a subset is additive over the items in the set. The objective of the firm is to maximize expected per-customer revenue.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm has 2 n − 1 prices to set. However, it is important to find profitable yet simple pricing schemes that are determined by a small number of prices. Two such schemes are Pure Components (PC), where items are priced separately (and the price of a subset is understood to be the sum of its constituent prices), and Pure Bundling (PB), the strategy of only offering all the items together. A third scheme that generalizes both PC and PB is Mixed Bundling (MB), which offers individual item prices as well as a bundle price for all the items. MB can be seen as a form of price discrimination, where customers who highly value an item can buy it for its individual price, while customers with lower valuations still have a chance of buying it as part of a discounted bundle.
The efficacy of simple pricing schemes is of immense importance in retail, and has been studied over the past few decades in the economics literature, the operations research/marketing interface literature, and more recently, the computer science literature. For a single item, the solution is immediate: choose the price p maximizing p(1 − F (p)), where F is the CDF of the valuation (see [Mye81] ). However, for two items, even if their valuations are independent, bundling can be better than individual sales.
For example, suppose we have two products with IID valuations, each of which is 1 half the time, and 2 half the time. If we sell the items individually, we can always get a sale for 1, or get a sale half the time for 2. In either case, the combined expected revenue is 2. However, if we sell the items as a bundle for 3, then the bundle will be purchased 3 4 of the time, yielding an expected revenue of 9 4 . The key observation is that the valuation of the bundle is more concentrated around its mean than the valuation of the individual items, which causes less consumer heterogeneity, and we can choose a price that is the highest willingness-to-pay for a larger fraction of customers. This makes it easier to reduce deadweight loss, which is revenue lost from pricing a customer with positive valuation out of the market, and consumer surplus, which is revenue lost from offering a customer a better price than necessary.
The power of bundling is even greater when valuations are negatively correlated-consider two products with marginal valuations that are uniform on [0, 1] but correlated in a way such that they always sum to 1. In this case, offering the bundle at the price of 1 will always get a sale, extracting the entire welfare, while selling the items individually yields at most Of course, bundling is not always superior to individual sales-this is especially true once we consider production costs. For example, suppose we have two goods with IID valuations that are uniform on [0, 3], but each cost 2 to produce. Selling them individually at price 5 2 will yield a profit of 1 12 per item and is better than selling them as a bundle-these are low-profit-margin items that are only valuable to a small fraction of the population, and by bundling them we may force a customer into consuming a good for which her valuation is less than the production cost.
Over the decades, a lot of work has been done to compare the profit of Pure Bundling versus Pure Components. [AY76] write, "The chief defect of Pure Bundling is its difficulty in complying with Exclusion," where Exclusion refers to the principle that a transfer is better off not occuring when the consumer's valuation is below the producer's cost. It is observed in [Sch84] for the case of bivariate normal valuations that Pure Bundling is better when mean valuations are high compared to costs. [BB99] prove that bundling a large number of goods can extract almost all of the available surplus, but this is crucially dependent on the items being "information goods", i.e. goods with no production costs. [FN06] characterize conditions under which Pure Bundling outperforms Pure Components for a fixed number of items, and all of their conditions imply low costs.
[LFCK13] define a measure of consumer heterogeneity that increases with costs, and present computational results showing Pure Bundling performs poorly relative to Pure Components as their measure of consumer heterogeneity increases.
The indisputable conclusion from all this work is that high costs are the greatest impediment to the magic of bundling. However, we argue that there is a simple way to enjoy the effects of bundling while allowing for the flexibility of individual sales-sell all of the items as a bundle, but allow the customer to return any subset of items for a refund equal to their total production cost. We call this scheme Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC). It is a strict improvement of Pure Bundling where the customer's valuations that were below the cost have been truncated to equal the cost. Meanwhile, the firm is indifferent between producing an item for its cost or returning its cost to the customer, but PBDC makes it easier to sell the bundle because customers with low valuations for specific items won't be priced out of the market.
Importantly, there is great flexibility in how to present PBDC to the customer in a transparent and attractive way. In fact, we show that PBDC has a few equivalent formulations which can already be seen in the market. One formulation is a tariff to enter the market, after which all products are sold at cost. Alternatively, PBDC can be introduced with an individual price for each item and a per-item discount for each item purchased beyond the first. From a marketing point of view, the tariff strategy is more attractive when the number of items is large, while the discount strategy is more attractive when the number of items is small.
Our scheme can be compared to that of [HC05] , who recognized the need for a middle ground between Pure Bundling and Pure Components. They introduced the scheme Customized Bundling, which prices each bundle based only on its size, and not which items are included. [CLS08] 1 perform extensive numerical experiments for the same scheme, calling it Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP), showing that it can extract 99% of the optimal profit in their simulations.
PBDC can be seen as orthogonal to BSP-while BSP imposes symmetric pricing across items but allows non-linear pricing based on quantity, PBDC allows asymmetric pricing across items based on cost but imposes additive pricing once the customer pays the tariff to enter the market. When all item costs are identical, PBDC is a simplified version of BSP, because instead of having n prices to decide, there is only one price to decide, be it thought of as the bundle price, the tariff, or the discount. However, since we are able to relate PBDC to Pure Bundling, it is much easier to analyze. Our work provides the first theoretical explanation for some of the empirical successes in [CLS08] -indeed, in their simulations, costs are either equal, or insignificant (equal to half of the product's mean valuation).
We present two types of theoretical bounds in this paper. Both require that items have independent valuations, which is a standard and often necessary assumption in the bundling literature. Both also rely on a transformation from costs to negative valuations which as far as we know is new.
First, we prove that PBDC, with an appropriately chosen bundle price, extracts the entire welfare as the number of items approaches infinity, so long as the valuations have uniformly bounded variances. This type of result is based on the law of large numbers, which says that the sum of cost-truncated valuations, which we denote with the random variable X, lies within (1 ± ε)E[X] with high probability. Therefore, the bundle price of (1 − ε)E[X] will be accepted by a (1 − ε)-fraction of the customers, profiting almost the expected welfare, E[X] − C (C is the total cost of producing all the items), which is an upper bound on profit.
[BB99] have already proven this result for the case without costs, and [Arm99] has proven this result for a cost-based two-part tariff which we show is equivalent to PBDC, so this result in itself is not new. However, our analysis introduces the use of Cantelli's stronger, one-sided concentration inequality in bundling, recovering previous bounds asymptotically and achieving a better bound when the coefficient of variation of X is large. In the latter case, both of the previous works recommend a bundle price of C + ε(E[X] − C), earning negligible profit, whereas our analysis never recommends a bundle price below C + 1 3 (E[X] − C) and guarantees a non-zero profit. Furthermore, we recommend PBDC even when the number of items is small-the second type of theoretical bound we present is problem-independent, unaffected by the number of items or their variances. We prove that the expected profit of the best PBDC pricing is at least 1 5.2 of the expected profit of the optimal mechanism, except in detectable pathological cases, where the best PC pricing achieves this guarantee. The benchmark in this theorem is the maximum expected profit that could be achieved from explicitly pricing all subsets of items 2 . This is a tighter benchmark than expected welfare, which could be infinite without distributional assumptions.
We use tools from the computer science literature to bound this benchmark, most notably from [BILW14] , who prove in the costless case that the better of PB and PC earns at least 1 6 of 2 Technically, the optimal mechanism is also allowed to offer lotteries of items, which have been shown to be necessary for achieving the optimum, in [HR12]. the optimal revenue. We improve their bound from [HN12] . Finally, we generalize the result of Babaioff et al. to the case with costs, where PBDC is needed instead of PB. We should point out that when the benchmark is the optimal mechanism, one cannot simply truncate all valuations from below by cost, because the optimal mechanism could exploit low valuations to reduce the cannibalization of higher-profit options. In general, profit is non-monotone, i.e. increasing customer valuations can decrease the optimal profit, as reported in [HN12] .
In addition to the theoretical considerations, we provide a continuation of the numerical experiments from [CLS08] , extensively testing the efficacy of PBDC on a finite number of items. We use the same independent demand distributions with the same parameters as [CLS08] . In their setting where costs are low and identical across items, PBDC is a special case of BSP. However, it still attains between 97.5% and 100% of the (nearly optimal) BSP profit. If we allow costs to vary and be more significant, then PBDC drastically outperforms other simple mechanisms (PC, PB, BSP), demonstrating its robustness under different scenarios. In fact, the worst case for PBDC is the aforementioned setting where it attains 97.5% of the profit of the best simple mechanism; contrast this with 79.9%, 16.8%, 59.5% for PC, PB, BSP, respectively, in their wost-case settings. In addition to being profit-maximizing, PBDC also achieves excellent global surplus in our simulations. Finally, we show that PBDC attains between 96.6% and 99.4% of the optimal profit (which prices all subsets) when n = 3, and scales well as n increases.
The general goal of our work is to dispel the myth that high costs should drive a firm away from bundling and toward individual sales. PBDC allows the firm to reap the benefits of bundling while preventing items from being consumed for utility below cost. We should point out that there do exist costless examples with independent valuations on which PBDC performs poorly relative to the optimal mechanism (which is why it is necessary to include PC in the statement of the second theoretical result). Here is a list, along with why PBDC (equivalent to PB) is ill-advised for each instance:
• Example 15 from [HN12] : there are various different valuations, each of which realizes to an exorbitant value with a small probability; bundling is ineffective because the probability that more than one valuation is non-zero is infinitessimal
• Examples 1 and 2 from [Rub16]: there is a need to partition the items, i.e. split them into groups, and offer each group as a different bundle
• Example 4.2 from Section 4 of our paper: there is a need to price-discriminate, i.e. offer high individual prices and a discounted bundle price However, our numerical experiments demonstrate that over "average" instances, PBDC performs far better than these pathological constructions and the worst-case bound of Indeed, once PBDC has eliminated the effect of costs, selling everything under one bundle leaves very little to be desired.
Literature Review
Bundling has been the focus of many papers in three different disciplines: economics, computer science, and operations research/marketing science. In general, the literature can be classified into three categories: papers that provide insights, papers that suggest approximate algorithms with attractive worst-case bounds, and papers that develop computationally efficient algorithms. In this subsection we attempt to highlight the most important contributions to the bundling literature, independent of discipline. Two Items. In the economics literature, the earliest recognition of bundling being able to increase the revenue from selling two items is usually attributed to [Sti63]; other early research for two products includes [AY76, Sch84, MMW89]. Since then, [VK03, MRT07] have established conditions for bundling being optimal for two potentially correlated goods.
Simple Mechanisms. For more than two items, there is a great practical interest in finding simple pricing schemes that are both profitable and easy to explain to the customer; for surveys on how bundling has affected marketing practice see [ST02, VM09]. However, the only concrete, general pricing scheme we have found in this literature, other than the classical PC and PB, is the BSP proposed by [HC05] and [CLS08] . Our scheme, PBDC, attempts to add to this literature by providing a transparent, easy-to-compute heuristic.
Most of the attempts to prove that simple pricing schemes are indeed capturing most of the optimal profit have been restricted to special cases (see [MV06, MV07]), or empirical evidence, as in the case of BSP, where its great experimental success has been unexplained. That's where we turn to the computer science literature. There has been more general work on auctions with multiple buyers, or valuation functions where the valuation for a subset may not be additive over the items in the set, for which we refer to [RW15, Yao15] and the references therein. We focus on the case of a single buyer with additive valuations, which is the bundling problem.
In this special case, [HN12] introduce performance guarantees for simple mechanisms, which are further studied in [HR12, HN13]. One line of work ([LY13, BILW14]) culminated in a proof that either PB or PC must be within 1 6 of optimal, for arbitrary independent valuations. By relating PBDC to PB, and improving upon their techniques, we are able to prove that either PBDC or PC must be within 1 5.2 of optimal for the independent case with costs. When all costs are equal, PBDC is a special case of BSP, so our work provides the first theoretical explanation for some of the successes in [CLS08] .
Recently, mechanisms where items are partitioned before bundling have also been advocated as simple in [CH13, Rub16] . Our bound improves the theoretical guarantee for the partitioning scheme in [Rub16] from 1 6 to 1 5.2 . The same core-tail decomposition of [BILW14] has also been recently used in [BDHS15, Yao15] , so our new bound improves guarantees from those works as well.
Computational Solutions. Others have tried to tackle the problem with more items by giving up on simplicity and computing an explicit optimal or near-optimal solution using optimization techniques. A mixed integer programming formulation was first seen in [HM90] , and recently in the mechanism design literature, explicit polynomial-time solutions were provided via linear programming in [CDW12, CH13] .
As far as computing the optimal prices for simple mechanisms, [WHCA08] use non-linear mixed integer programming to solve for the optimal BSP prices, while [Rub16] gives a PTAS for the optimal partitioning. Computation is another benefit of PBDC-like PB, it only requires calculating one price, which can be done via convolution.
Large Number of Items. Yet another line of work addresses the complexity of many items by claiming that PB is guaranteed to be optimal as the number of items approaches infinity, assuming independence and uniformly bounded variances. Traditionally, this line of work has dealt with information goods which have no marginal costs (see [BB99, BB00] ), or showed that costs have a substantial effect on the efficacy of PB (see [FN06, IW10] ). [Arm99] advocates that the same result can be achieved with costs by using a cost-based two-part tariff, which we prove is equivalent to PBDC.
Our research strengthens this line of work by using Cantelli's one-sided concentration inequality to get a tighter problem-dependent bound. Furthermore, we advocate for PBDC even on a small number of items, both with our problem-independent bound, and our numerical experiments.
Closed-form Solutions. There is also interest in finding analytical closed-form solutions for the optimal pricing under simple cases of the problem. In the case of two independent valuations, one of which is uniform on [0, b 1 ] and the other which is uniform on [0, b 2 ], [Eck10] derives elementary equations for the optimal Mixed Bundling prices. [Bha13] shows that the equations involve roots of high-degree polynomials once costs are introduced, and uses a linear approximation to record solutions. Our transformation in Section 2 shows that the problem with costs is equivalent to the problem for distributions uniform on [a 1 , b 1 ] and [a 2 , b 2 ], where a 1 and a 2 could be negative. The difficulty of analytical solutions in general is discussed in [Wil93, Arm96, PVM10].
Summary of Contributions and Outline of Paper
• We introduce the idea of PBDC, eliminating the problem costs pose to bundling (Section 2):
-We show that PBDC has equivalent formulations in the cost-based two-part tariff that exists in the theoretical literature, as well as a new per-item discount scheme -The idea of PBDC motivates a transformation from costs to negative valuations, enabling the analysis in subsequent sections
• We improve "large-number-of-items" bounds for the performance of PBDC, using Cantelli's inequality (Section 3):
-We recover existing bounds asymptotically and achieve a better bound when the coefficient of variation is large -Our bound suggests that the firm should not price the bundle such that the profit margin is less than 1/3 of the expected welfare
• We provide finite-item, distribution-free bounds for the performance of PBDC (Section 4):
-We generalize existing bounds to the case with costs, where PBDC is needed instead of PB -We improve existing bounds in both directions (upper and lower bound)
-We compare this type of performance guarantee to that in the previous section
• We provide a continuation of the numerical experiments from [CLS08] , demonstrating the efficacy of PBDC for a finite number of items (Section 5)
Set-up and Equivalence Propositions
A firm has n different items for sale. For each i, the cost incurred by the firm for selling item i is c i , a non-negative real number. c i can be thought of as an instantaneous production cost, the opportunity cost of saving the inventory for someone else, or the value of the item to the seller. Each of the firm's customers has a valuation vector x ∈ R n for the items. A customer wants at most one of each item, and her utility for a subset of items S is i∈S x i . x can be thought of as a random vector drawn from D, the distribution of valuation vectors across the population. The firm is risk-neutral and its objective is to maximize the expected per-customer profit.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm's mechanism for selling the items is a menu M of entries (q, s), where q ∈ [0, 1] n is the allocation indicating the fraction of each item transferred to the customer, and s is the payment that must be made for this allocation. If q has fractional entries, then the allocation can be thought of as a lottery where the customer only gets some items with a certain probability. The customer is also risk-neutral and chooses the entry maximizing her expected surplus, q T x − s. We will assume that for every entry, the payment covers the expected cost for the firm to produce that allocation, i.e. s ≥ q T c, where c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). Simultaneously removing all entries in the menu with s < q T c cannot decrease the profit, since this can only force a customer who previously selected an entry with negative profit to select an entry with non-negative profit.
Let X denote the support of D. Given a menu M, for all x ∈ X , let q M (x) denote the allocation chosen by a customer with valuation vector x, and s M (x) denote the corresponding payment. We will omit the subscript M when the context is clear. (q M (x), s M (x)) must maximize the surplus of the customer among all entries of M 3 (the mechanism is incentive-compatible), and one of these entries must be the no-purchase option with q = 0, s = 0 (the mechanism is individually rational ).
The firm's profit maximization problem can be written as
However, the optimization over general menus is intractable, and the resulting menu may not be practical.
Definition 2.1. A pricing scheme is a restricted class of menus, implied by a compact way of communicating the menu to the customer. It is assumed that the optimization problem over the restricted class of menus can be solved efficiently.
The following pricing schemes are frequently referenced throughout this paper:
1. Pure Components (PC): items are offered individually, at respective non-negative prices P PC 1 , . . . , P PC n .
2. Pure Components with Uniform Discount (PCUD): items are offered individually, at respec-
There is an absolute discount of P PCUD 0 which is applied to each item bought beyond the first. For all i,
3. Pure Bundling (PB): all of the items are offered in a single bundle at non-negative price P PB 0 , and there are no separate sales.
4. Pure Bundling with Disposal (PBD): all of the items are offered in a single bundle at price
, with the agreement that if the customer buys the bundle, she can return any subset of items S for a refund equal to i∈S
5. Tariff Pricing (TP): there is a membership fee of P TP 0 to enter the market. If the customer enters the market, she can buy up to one unit of each item i for the price of P TP i . P TP 0 , P TP 1 , . . . , P TP n are all imposed to be non-negative.
6. Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP): the price of a subset S is P BSP |S| , which is dependent only on the number of items in S, and not which items are in
PC and PB were introduced by [AY76] . PCUD and PBD are variations of PC and PB, respectively, and to the best of our knowledge, PCUD and PBD are new to our paper. BSP was introduced by [HC05, CLS08] , while the idea of TP could be seen in [Arm99] . Note that PC corresponds to the degenerate case of PBD where
Our first observation is the following: Proposition 2.2. PCUD, PBD, and TP represent the same class of menus. Specifically, given a PBD representation with prices
the corresponding PCUD representation is
and the corresponding TP representation is
The proofs of propositions are deferred to Appendix A. Hereinafter, we will always refer to PBD instead of PCUD and TP for the analysis; however, the existence of PCUD and TP gives the firm additional flexibility in how to describe these menus to the customer. Specifically, when the number of items is small, PCUD should be used instead of TP, since it does not sound so enticing for one to pay a surcharge in order to buy a small number of items. On the other hand, when the number of items is large, P PCUD 0 tends to be large, causing the individual items to be marked at exorbitant prices should PCUD be used. In this case, paying a membership fee to have access to all the items does not sound so bad.
We are especially interested in the following subclass of PBD, where P PBD i = c i for all i. Similar subclasses can also be defined for PCUD and TP, following Proposition 2.2.
Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC): the bundle with all of the items is offered at P PBD
0
. If the customer buys the bundle, she can return any subset S of items for a refund of i∈S c i .
Setting the refund for each item equal to its cost is a logical restriction to put on PBD. To see why, consider the following definitions: Definition 2.3. The welfare generated by a customer with valuations (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is n i=1 max{x i − c i , 0}, which is realized when every item valued above cost is transferred and no other items are transferred. Welfare can be split up as follows:
• The total surplus is the welfare realized from transfers that occurred, equal to n i=1 q i (x)(x i − c i ). Total surplus can be further split up depending on the price charged:
-The producer surplus is another term for the profit earned by the firm, equal to
-The consumer surplus is the utility gained by the customer, equal to
• The deadweight loss is the welfare lost because an item valued above cost was not transferred, equal to i:
• The overinclusion loss 4 is the welfare lost because items were consumed for utility below cost, equal to i:
It is clear from the equations that the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, deadweight loss, and overinclusion loss is i:x i >c i (x i − c i ), equal to welfare. Also, the fact that the consumer surplus is non-negative (since the customer can always choose the no-purchase option) implies that the profit is no greater than the total surplus, which in turn is no greater than the welfare.
PBDC (and thus PBD) is strictly better than PB in the following sense:
Proposition 2.4. Given a PB menu with price P PB which is at least c 1 + . . . + c n , consider instead the PBD menu with prices (P PBD
• The producer surplus is no less than before.
• The consumer surplus is no less than before.
• The deadweight loss is no more than before.
• The overinclusion loss is no more than before.
Note that the preceding statements are not only in expectation; for every valuation vector x both the firm and the customer are better off. There is no reason to use PB if PBDC can be used instead, because PBDC is effectively PB where all valuations x i have been replaced by max{x i , c i }. This observation leads us to the following lemma:
Proposition 2.5. The firm's problem of maximizing expected profit with distribution D and costs c is equivalent to the transformed problem of maximizing expected revenue with distribution D , where D is the distribution D shifted downward by c i in every dimension i. Furthermore, for any menu in the original problem, the corresponding menu in the transformed problem has the payment for each allocation reduced by the cost of producing that allocation.
on the means and variances of the individual distributions, PBDC is asymptotically optimal as the number of items becomes large.
[Arm99] has already proven this result for Cost-based Tariff Pricing (TP with the additional restriction that P TP i = c i for all i), which is equivalent to PBDC via Proposition 2.2. However, our analysis works under weaker assumptions, by employing Cantelli's inequality, along with other tools. To our knowledge, we are the first to use Cantelli's one-sided concentration inequality to get an improved performance bound for bundling; previous works by [BB99, Arm99, FN06] all use the weaker Chebyshev's inequality. The analysis also motivates our finite-item, distribution-free bounds in Section 4, where we again make improvements using Cantelli's inequality.
Lemma 3.1. (Cantelli's Inequality) Let X be a random variable with (finite) mean µ and variance σ 2 . Let t be an arbitrary non-negative real number. Then
We refer the reader to [Lug09] for a proof, as well as more background. Our main result in this section is the following: 
In particular, if
then the expected revenue is at least
which in turn is at least
(6) shows that when the coefficient of variation is close to 0, ε scales with (Cv
3 ) −fraction of the expected welfare, recovering the result from [BB99] and [Arm99] . However, for larger Cv + (D), we still get a non-zero revenue guarantee in (5), and interestingly our analysis never recommends offering the bundle below the price of (1−
. Contrast this to the previous analyses, which recommend ε = 1 when Cv
earning zero revenue. The value of ε in (4), recommended by our analysis, is useful even when the firm has the resources to compute the optimal value of ε from D-both as a managerial reference point, as well as in situations where the firm knows the mean and variance in demand but is uncertain about the exact distribution.
Theorem 3.2 treats the welfare as an abstract random variable, but the revenue guarantee is weak if the coefficient of variation is large. Independence is important in allowing the "law of large numbers" to control Cv + (D) when the number of items n is large.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose a firm is selling n items to a customer with independent valuations x 1 , . . . , x n forming product distribution D. Let µ min be a lower bound on E[max{x i , 0}], and let σ 2 max be an upper bound on Var[max{x i , 0}], over i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose µ min > 0, σ max < ∞, and n > ( σmax µ min ) 2 . Then the expected revenue of an optimal menu within PBDC is at least
Taking n → ∞, we get the result that PBDC extracts the entire welfare. Note that truncating the random variables denote the coefficient of variation of X. We would like to bound the probability that X < (1 − ε)µ from above. Applying Cantelli's inequality with t = εµ, this probability is at most σ 2 σ 2 +ε 2 µ 2 . Therefore, our expected revenue is at least
The fraction of expected welfare earned is
The first inequality uses the weighted arithmetic mean-geometric mean inequality (see [Zha08] for a reference), which yields (this is motivated by setting the derivative of (8) to zero), then the LHS of (7) becomes where the inequality holds because the expression in parentheses is less than 1. This establishes both (5) and (6), completing the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 3.3. By independence, Var[
, and it is easy to see from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that all of its statements continue to hold when Cv + (D) is replaced by an upper bound on Cv
) 2 ensures that Cv + (D) < 1, and the result follows immediately from substituting Cv
Finite-item, Distribution-free Performance Bounds
In this section we analyze the performance of PBDC with only the independence assumption on the items, whose costs have been transformed into negative valuations according to Section 2. All proofs are deferred to Appendices B-C, but we sketch the techniques needed to handle arbitrary distributions.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose a firm is selling items to a customer with independent (and potentially negative) valuations forming product distribution D. Let Rev(D) denote the expected revenue of an optimal menu (along with tie-breaking rules) for distribution D. Then the expected revenue of either the optimal menu within PBDC or the optimal menu within PC is at least
In the previous section, we showed that with assumptions on the number of items and their variances, PBDC can earn almost all of the expected welfare, Val + (D). However, this is clearly false without distributional assumptions-Val + (D) can be infinite. To recover some guarantee on performance, we need to use the core-tail decomposition, a technique developed through [HN12, LY13, BILW14] . The idea of the core-tail decomposition is to split off from each independent distribution all the valuations above a large positive cutoff (the "tail"). The remaining valuations (the "core") are bounded, and it can be shown using a concentration inequality that PB (in our case PBDC) *The advantages of each bound are bolded.
performs well relative to the welfare of the core. Meanwhile, PC can be shown to perform well relative to the optimal mechanism in the tail. Finally, the core bound (relative to the expected welfare of the core) and the tail bound (relative to the optimal expected revenue for the tail) can be combined to get a performance guarantee relative to the optimal expected revenue on D.
Theorem 4.1 improves upon the main result of [BILW14] by increasing the guarantee from 1 6 to 1 5.2 , and allowing for negative valuations. The differences in our analysis can be summarized as follows:
• We analyze the core and tail together, and show that the worst case for PBDC in the core and worst case for PC in the tail cannot simultaneously occur
• We use Cantelli's inequality instead of Chebyshev's inequality in the core bound
• We show that the core bound and the tail bound can still be combined to upper-bound the optimal revenue on D when the optimal mechanism can exploit negative valuations Table 1 compares Theorem 4.1 to the type of bound in the previous section, in particular Corollary 3.3. Essentially, to accommodate arbitrary distributions, we have to settle for a constant fraction of the optimum, compare against an optimum that is convoluted, and also allow ourselves to use PC in pathological cases.
One additional point worth mentioning is that it is unclear from Theorem 4.1 what the optimal prices for PBDC or PC are. It is assumed that the firm, knowing distribution D, can compute the optimal prices for both PBDC and PC and use the scheme with higher expected revenue, with the knowledge that it will be within 1 5.2 of optimal. Meanwhile, Theorem 3.2, with its simpler analysis, has an explicit benchmark price of
Finally, we address the tightness of Theorem 4.1. First we present a theoretical upper bound. . The best possible PB revenue is also 2ρ, attained by selling the bundle at the price of 2 or 3. The optimal revenue is at least 2ρ(2 − ρ); this value can be achieved by selling individual items at the price of 2, and the bundle at the discounted price of 3. Therefore, neither PC nor PB can obtain more than In Example 4.2, both PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need to price-discriminate, i.e. allow customers who highly value an item to buy it for its individual price, but still give customers with lower valuations a chance of buying it as part of a discounted bundle. Very recently, [Rub16] constructed an example where both PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need to partition the items, i.e. split them into groups, and offer each group as a different bundle. In his example, the better of PC and PB can only obtain 1 2 + ε of the revenue via partitioning, which is smaller than our bound. However, our example exhibits the worst-known loss from not pricediscriminating, where even partitioning performs poorly relative to the optimal mechanism. Our example also only requires two IID items, following the examples of [HN12, HR12] ; the example in [Rub16] requires a large number of distinct items.
Nonetheless, there is a large gap between the best-known lower bound from Theorem 4.1 and the best-known upper bounds, and furthermore, being guaranteed only 1 5.2 ≈ 19.2% of the optimal profit does not sound so enticing. However, this bound arises from a worst-case analysis that needs to address pathological instances, on which PBDC does not obtain 1 5.2 of the optimum, but PC does. In the next section, we test the performance of PBDC over "average" instances.
Numerical Experiments
In this section we conduct a continuation of the numerical experiments from [CLS08] where PBDC is included as an additional pricing scheme. As a disclaimer, we should quote [CLS08] on the limitations inherent to this kind of numerical analysis:
"Although we attempt to cover a large space of parameter values, the results clearly depend on the specific parameters we choose (i.e., the choice of grid). Further, there is no way for us to know whether we are under-or oversampling the relevant (i.e., empirically plausible) combinations of parameters. So, for example, when we describe average outcomes, these should certainly not be interpreted as outcomes that would be expected in an empirical sensethey should be interpreted narrowly as the average of the experiments we performed."
Procedure
For consistency, we follow the setup from [CLS08] as closely as possible. We use the same five families of valuation distributions commonly used to model demand-Exponential, Logit, Lognormal, Normal, and Uniform. We also use the same ranges of parameters for these families, as outlined in Table 2 . The parameters were calibrated so that valuations across different families have similar means on average, and the highest means are around 10 times the lowest means. We allow for free disposal, just like [CLS08]-all negative valuations are converted to 0. We assume that valuations are independent across items.
As far as costs, we consider three scenarios:
1. Heterogeneous Items: valuation distributions fluctuate in accordance with Table 2 , while costs are low. The cost of each item is set to 0.2, except in the case of Uniform distributions, where it is set to half the item's mean valuation. These are the same numbers used in [CLS08] , so this scenario is a duplicate of some of their experiments. Table 3 -we choose a mean that is on the high end of the range to avoid degenerate instances, where the welfare in the system is near 0 when costs are high.
3. Heterogeneous Items and Costs: both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to fluctuate (independently) according to the preceding scenarios.
The parameters and costs are summarized in Table 3 . We compare the four simple pricing schemes-PC, PB, BSP, and PBDC. Unlike [CLS08], we do not compute the optimal deterministic profit with 2 n − 1 prices, since it is hard to compute, difficult to implement in practice, and could be far off from the optimal profit of a randomized mechanism anyway. Skipping this expensive computation allows us to consider n from 2 up to 6.
For each combination of the 3 cost scenarios, 5 demand distributions, and 5 options for n, we randomly generate 200 instances, resulting in 15000 total instances. [CLS08] were able to discretize the parameter space for each combination and generate 220 instances in a grid. While generating instances in a grid is more reliable than generating instances randomly, we simply have too many combinations, because we allow costs to vary independently, allow for larger n, and in the case of Normal distributions, also allow variances to vary independently. Our randomized approach has the advantage of being scalable, and not depending on the exact grid chosen. Furthermore, we have verified that 200 instances per combination is enough, in that repeating the experiments does not cause the reported observations to change by any significance.
Observations
First, we report the performance of the simple pricing schemes separated by scenario. For each instance (out of the 15000), we compute which of PC, PB, BSP, PBDC earns the most profit on that instance, and record the performance of every pricing scheme as a fraction of this optimum. For each scenario (out of the 3), we report the median performance as well as 10'th percentile performance of every pricing scheme across the 1000 instances of each distribution family (200 for each of n = 2, . . . , 6), in Table 4 . We also count the number of instances on which each pricing scheme was best, in Table 5 . *For each scenario, the best performance in each row is bolded. The overall worst median performance of each pricing scheme is italicized.
We know from [CLS08] that BSP is within 1% of the deterministic optimum in most of their settings, so there is minimal room for improvement under scenario 1. In fact, PBDC is a special case of BSP when all costs are identical, and very similar to PB when costs are low. However, as one can see in Table 4 , PBDC still extracts close to 100% of the BSP profit under this scenario, hence it also extracts close to 100% of the deterministic optimum. For Uniform valuations, PBDC is no longer a special case of BSP, since costs vary proportionally with means. PBDC actually outperforms BSP in this setting-indeed, this is by far the worst setting for BSP listed in [CLS08, tbl. 5], where it only extracts 91% of the deterministic optimum.
Scenario 2, where valuation distributions are identical but costs are allowed to fluctuate, really exhibits the power of PBDC, which allows customers to consume only the items they value above cost via self-selection. PC loses out on not bundling similar items that differ only in cost, while BSP is forced to compromise between charging cheap prices where high-cost items may be consumed for utility below cost, or charging expensive prices that result in a lot of deadweight loss in the low-cost items. In Appendix D, we show an instance that exemplifies why BSP performs so poorly when the costs in the setup from [CLS08] are increased.
When both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to vary under scenario 3, PBDC is still the best strategy by a significant margin. However, the benefits of bundling have decreased when items can be drastically different, so PC has gained ground. It seems intuitive to hypothesize that the performance of PC is inflated by the small values of n we are using. In the next subsection, we organize our reports separated by n, under scenario 3 (where both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to fluctuate). 
Separation by n and Effects on Welfare
In this subsection, we allow both valuation distributions and costs to vary, and report averages across demand distributions, separated by n (instead of medians over the different choices for n, separated by demand distribution). Since the distribution families we're amalgamating were calibrated to have similar means over their ranges of parameters, it makes sense in this subsection to report average absolute profits, instead of median fractions. We also report the figures defined in Definition 2.3, in the same way as [CLS08] .
In Table 6 , we report the expected values of these figures across the 1000 instances for each n. The main conclusions are best summarized in Figures 1-2 .
The first graph (Figure 1) shows that although PBDC optimizes from the perspective of a selfish monopolist interested only in Producer Surplus, it has a similar advantage in Total Surplus. There is no Overinclusion Loss, and the monopolist is encouraged to choose a low tariff price so that most customers can enter the market. PC also incurs no Overinclusion Loss, but incurs more Deadweight Loss because it does not bundle. PB incurs significantly more Overinclusion Loss than any other strategy, forcing the customer into buying every item at once. All in all, PBDC is equally attractive from the standpoint of an altruistic policymaker interested in maximizing Total Surplus. The second graph (Figure 2) shows the profits of each pricing scheme as n increases. The PC profits increase linearly with n, since items are sold separately. Both the PB and the BSP profits are concave in n-that is, the marginal gain from having one more item to sell is decreasing. Indeed, PB is burdened with adding to its grand bundle another item that could be valued below cost, while BSP is burdened with an additional distinct item to consider in its item-symmetric cost structure. PBDC is the only pricing scheme where the profit is convex in n, as each item creates additional incentive for the customer to enter the market, and makes their total utility from entering the market more concentrated. This confirms the hypothesis that while Table 4 reports a small gap between PC and PBDC under scenario 3, this gap quickly widens as n increases.
Grid Instances and Comparing with the Deterministic Optimum for n = 3
In this subsection, we generate instances in a grid where both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to vary, for the n = 3 case. There are 3 possibilities for distribution mean and 3 possibilities for cost for each of 3 different items, resulting in a total of 3 6 = 729 instances. This is repeated over the 5 different demand distributions. The grid is outlined in Table 7 ; we centered the grid around the values from Table 3 .
We report the performance of each simple pricing scheme over these 729 instances in the same manner as Table 4 , except this time every number is recorded as a fraction of the optimal deter- ministic profit, which is at least the profit of any simple pricing scheme. The results are displayed in Table 8 . In the median case, PBDC obtains between 96.6% to 99.4% of the deterministic optimum across the different demand distributions. This confirms both that PBDC is performing well relative to the optimal deterministic profit and not just other simple mechanisms, and that our earlier numbers with random instances are consistent.
To summarize our numerical experiments, we considered both scenarios with low costs and scenarios with high costs, and reported median performances over n = 2, . . . , 6 for different demand distributions. When costs are low, PC can earn as little as 79.9% of the profit of the optimal simple mechanism. When costs are high, PB can earn as little as 16.8% of the profit of the optimal simple mechanism, BSP can earn as little as 59.5%, and PC also falls behind as n increases. PBDC has the highest percentages overall, and is by far the most robust over different cost scenarios, always obtaining at least 97.5% of the profit of the optimal simple mechanism. We should point out that throughout our simulations, PBDC was also computationally much faster than BSP, requiring an optimization over 1 price instead of n.
Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper, we propose a simple strategy for the multi-product pricing problem: Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost, or PBDC. We prove that PBDC is asymptotically optimal. When there are only a small number of items, we still guarantee that either PBDC or PC earns at least 1 5.2 ≈ 19.2% of the optimal profit, and our simulations suggest that this is closer to 96.6%-99.4% in the average case, and that PC is not needed. While this is worse than the 99% achieved by [CLS08] for BSP in their experiments with lower costs, the pricing problem becomes much harder when costs are significant, and the existing simple pricing schemes (including BSP) fall behind PBDC by a great deal. Yet, production costs exceeding mean valuations is a common occurrence in industry, where only a small fraction of a company's customers may have interest in any particular item.
One caveat with PBDC is that the prices do reveal production costs to the customer. If this is undesired, a potential remedy is optimizing prices over the larger class of Tariff Pricing (TP) strategies, which has n + 1 degrees of freedom and is guaranteed to be at least as profitable as PBDC. We believe that using TP instead of PBDC is very reasonable in practice, so long as the firm can accept the significant increase in computation time and decrease in the manager's ability to interpret the pricing.
However, the true demand distribution is never known, and must be constructed from data. When the given demand is prone to error, we hypothesize that there is additional benefit in choosing strategies that optimize one price at a time (such as PC, PB, PBDC) over strategies that optimize Θ(n) prices together (such as BSP, TP, MB). Besides, the theoretical guarantee for PBDC is no worse than that for TP, and PBDC is optimal as the number of items approaches infinity. We find it particularly interesting that as n increases and there are more potential prices to optimize, the benefit of optimizing only one price is greater.
All in all, PBDC captures the concentration effects of bundling and the selection effects of individual sales in a single heuristic that is computationally minimal and highly marketable. We hope our work on PBDC will have an impact on both the theory and practice of bundling, and be viewed as an effort to tie together the streams of research from three different disciplines: economics, computer science, and operations research. [PVM10] Ashutosh Prasad, R Venkatesh, and Vijay Mahajan, Optimal bundling of technological products with network externality, Management Science 56 (2010), no. 12, 2224-2236.
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Appendix A: Proofs from Section 2
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.2. By the definition of PBD, the customer can purchase any nonempty subset S of items for the price of
. Of course, the customer can also choose not to make a purchase. Altogether, the class of menus represented by PBD is
where 1 S ∈ {0, 1} n is the indicator vector for items belonging to S. Now, note that (2) defines a valid menu within PCUD since for all i, P PCUD
which is identical to (9). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (2) is a bijection between (9) and
Similarly, note that (3) defines a valid menu within TP since 
which is identical to (9). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (3) is a bijection between (9) and
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.4. Consider any valuation vector x ∈ R n . First suppose the customer bought the bundle with all the items for P PB . Under the PBD menu, the customer will still buy the bundle, since it is non-negative utility even if she keeps all the items. However, she will choose to return any items i with x i < c i . Let S denote the set of such items, which is possibly empty.
• The producer surplus under PB is P PB − n i=1 c i . The producer surplus under PBD is (P PB − i∈S c i ) − i / ∈S c i , which is identical.
• The consumer surplus under PB is
max{x i , c i } − P PB which can only be greater than the consumer surplus under PB.
• The deadweight loss is 0 in both cases: under PB every item is transferred, whereas under PBD every item valued above cost is still transferred.
• The overinclusion loss under PB is i∈S (c i − x i ) ≥ 0. The overinclusion loss under PBD is 0, since items in S are not transferred.
On the other hand, suppose the customer did not buy the bundle with all the items for P PB .
• The producer surplus under PB is 0. The producer surplus under PBD is either 0 or P PB − n i=1 c i (if the return option allowed the customer to enter the market), which is non-negative.
• The consumer surplus under PB is 0. The consumer surplus under PBD cannot be negative, since the customer is rational and the no-purchase option is always available.
• The deadweight loss under PB is i:x i >c i (x i −c i ), which is the maximum possible. Therefore, the deadweight loss under PBD cannot be greater.
• The overinclusion loss under PB is 0. The overinclusion loss under PBD is always 0 when P PBD i = c i for all i, since items valued below cost are never transferred.
In both cases, we have proven that the statements in Proposition 2.4 hold.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.5. The firm's problem is to find a menu along with tie-breaking rules which maximize profit. Note that this is equivalent to finding functions q, s defined on X which are incentive-compatible, individually rational, and profit-maximizing. Formally, the firm's problem is
which can be rewritten as . We can see that the above is equivalent to
which is identical to the original problem without costs on this new distribution D . Now suppose there was a restriction on the menu M = {(q (1) , s (1) ), (q (2) , s (2) ), . . .} to belong to some class M in the original problem. The menu after the transformation, M , looks like
By assumption that s − q T c ≥ 0 for all menu entries, the payments in M are non-negative.
Throughout this paper, it will be clear whether we are in the context of the original problem or the transformed problem, and we will omit the superscripts used in the preceding proof.
Remark 7.1. As a concrete example of this transformation, consider the pricing scheme PBDC. M is restricted to be of the form {(1 S ,
the indicator vector for items belonging to S. Hence M is restricted to be of the form
Put in words, M must belong to the class of menus that offer the same price for any non-empty subset of items. The fact that the customer can choose to take a subset of items instead of taking all the items is important, because valuations x i can be negative (x i is equal to the original valuation x i subtract the cost c i ).
8 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4.1
We will WOLOG normalize the valuations so that the optimal PC revenue is 1 (we can do this so long as the original optimal revenue was positive; if it was 0 then the statement of the theorem is trivial).
The Core-Tail Decomposition
We use the core-tail decomposition of [BILW14] , with the original idea coming from [LY13]. We will cut up the domain of the joint distribution and consider the conditional distributions on the smaller subdomains. Below, we introduce the notation for working with these distributions on smaller subdomains. One should get comfortable with the idea that some of the distributions defined could be the null distribution, if they were distributions conditioned on a set of measure 0, or a product over an empty set of distributions. The product of a null distribution with any other distribution is still a null distribution.
Definition 8.1. We make the following definitions for this appendix.
• For all i ∈ [n], let r i denote the optimal revenue earned by selling item i individually (by our normalization, n i=1 r i = 1).
• Let D C i (the "core" of D i ) denote the conditional distribution of D i when it lies in the range (−∞, 1].
• Let D T i (the "tail" of D i ) denote the conditional distribution of D i when it lies in the range (1, ∞).
• Let p i := P x i ∼D i [x i > 1], the probability item i lies in its tail.
• Let A ⊆ [n] represent a subset of items, usually the items whose valuations lie in their tails.
• Let D T A := × i∈A D T i , the product distribution of only items in their tails.
• Let D C A := × i / ∈A D C i , the product distribution of only items in their cores.
• Let D A := D C A × D T A , the conditional distribution of D when exactly the subset A of items lie in their tails. Let p A be the probability this occurs, which is equal to ( i / ∈A (1−p i ))( i∈A p i ), by independence.
• Let x + i := max{x i , 0}.
• For any valuation distribution S, let Val + (S) :
, which is the expected welfare after the transformation from costs to negative valuations. Note that the sum is only over the admissible i if S is a distribution on a smaller subdomain.
• Let Rev(S) denote the optimal revenue obtainable from valuation distribution S via any Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational mechanism, which could include lotteries.
• Let SRev(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the class of separate sales (Pure Components).
• Let BdcRev(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the class of PBDC.
(It is understood that Val + , Rev, SRev, BdcRev are 0 when evaluated on the null distribution.)
Lemmas for Negative Valuations
We need to modify the statements of lemmas from [HN12] , [LY13], and [BILW14] to handle negative valuations. While their proofs can be extended to negative valuations in a straight-forward manner, we provide full self-contained proofs here for ease of exposition.
Lemma 8.2. (Marginal Mechanism) Let S, S be (potentially negative) valuation distributions over disjoint sets of items. Then
The Marginal Mechanism tells us that when selling a group of independent items, we cannot do better than breaking off some items individually, extracting the entire welfare from those items, and selling the remaining items as a group.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.2. Consider the following mechanism for selling to a buyer with valuations drawn from S . First, sample a value v ∼ S, and reveal to the buyer these make-believe valuations for the items in S. Then run a mechanism obtaining Rev(S × S ) on this buyer, with the modification that whenever the buyer would have received an item i from the support of S, instead she will receive (or pay) money equal to v i . By independence, this modified mechanism on the buyer with valuations drawn from S is IC and IR (a buyer with valuations S will choose the same menu entry under the modified mechanism as a buyer with valuations S × S would have chosen under the original mechanism) and we will obtain Rev(S × S ), but then have to settle for the items in S. The most we stand to lose in the settlement is i v + i (each item i in S is transferred in full whenever v i ≥ 0, and not transferred when v i < 0), so this amount is upper bounded in expectation by Val + (S). Therefore, the optimal revenue from S is at least Rev(S ×S )−Val + (S), completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8.3. (Subdomain Stitching) Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with support X ⊆ R m for some m ∈ N. Let X 1 , . . . , X k form a partition of X inducing conditional distributions S (1) , . . . , S (k) , respectively, and let
Intuitively, Subdomain Stitching says that revenue can only increase if we sell to each subdomain separately, since we can use a different mechanism for each subdomain that specializes in extracting the welfare from that customer segment.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.3. Let M be an optimal mechanism obtaining Rev(S), and for any valuation distribution S , let Rev M (S ) denote the expected revenue obtained from mechanism M when the buyer's valuation is drawn from S . Clearly Rev(S) = k j=1 s j Rev M (S (j) ), and furthermore for all j ∈ [k], Rev M (S (j) ) ≤ Rev(S (j) ) since M is an IC-IR mechanism for selling to S (j) , completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8.4. Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with support X ⊆ R m for some m ∈ N. Let X be a subset of X inducing conditional distribution S , and let s = P x∼S [x ∈ X ]. Then
Rev(S) ≥ s Rev(S )
While Subdomain Stitching places an upper bound on Rev(S), Lemma 8.4 places a lower bound on Rev(S) based on the optimal revenue of any single subdomain.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.4. Consider an optimal mechanism for S , and extend this to an IC-IR mechanism on S by allowing the buyer to report a value in X maximizing her utility. With probability s , the buyer's valuation will actually be drawn from S and we will obtain revenue Rev(S ); otherwise, we still earn a non-negative revenue, since the mechanism never admits a negative payment. Therefore, the optimal revenue for S is at least s Rev(S ), completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8.5. Let S be a product distribution over m independent (potentially negative) valuations, for some m ∈ N. Then
While selling m items together can definitely be better than selling them separately, this lemma tells us it can be no more than m times better.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.5. We proceed by induction. The statement is trivial when m = 1. Now, suppose we have proven the statement for m valuations, and we will prove it for m + 1 valuations.
Partition the support X ⊆ R m+1 of S into X 1 and X 2 , where X 1 := {x ∈ X : x 1 ≥ max{x j , 0} ∀ j = 2, . . . , m + 1} and X 2 := X \ X 1 . Let s 1 denote the probability a value sampled from S lies in X 1 , and let S 1 be its distribution conditioned on this event. Define s 2 , S 2 respectively. Subdomain stitching tells us Rev(S) ≤ s 1 Rev(S (1) ) + s 2 Rev(S (2) ). Our goal is to separately show that s 1 Rev(S (1) ) ≤ (m + 1)SRev(S 1 ) and s 2 Rev(S (2) ) ≤ (m + 1)SRev(S −1 ). 
−1 ), consider the following mechanism for selling just item 1: sample v −1 ∼ S −1 , and set the price to be max m+1 i=2 {max{v i , 0}}. Since the buyer's valuation is drawn from S 1 , by independence, we get a sale with probability exactly s 1 . Furthermore, max m+1 i=2 {max{v i , 0}} ≥ 1 m m+1 i=2 max{v i , 0}, so conditioned on us getting a sale, the expected payment is at least
−1 ), hence s 1 Rev(S (1) ) ≤ (m + 1)Rev(S 1 ) = (m + 1)SRev(S 1 ), as required. It remains to bound s 2 Rev(S (2) ), and using Marginal Mechanism and Lemma 8.4 in the same way as before, we obtain that it is no more than s 2 Val + (S
1 ) + Rev(S −1 ). Consider the following mechanism for selling items 2, . . . , m + 1: sample v 1 ∼ S 1 , and set the individual price for each item 2, . . . , m + 1 to be max{v 1 , 0}. Note that the probability of getting at least one sale is less than s 2 , since even when there is some j = 2, . . . , m + 1 such that v 1 < max{x j , 0}, it is possible for both v 1 , x j to be negative. However, in this case max{v 1 , 0} = 0, so not getting a sale is still equivalent to getting at least one sale for max{v 1 , 0}. Therefore, we can think of it as we get at least one sale with probability s 2 , in which case we earn in expectation at least Val + (S
1 ). We have proven that
1 ) ≤ SRev(S −1 ), and by the induction hypothesis
Putting everything together, we have Rev(S) ≤ (m + 1)(SRev(S 1 ) + SRev(S −1 )) = (m + 1)SRev(S), completing the induction and the proof of the lemma.
Using these lemmas, we decompose the revenue of the initial distribution D in the same way as [BILW14] :
where the first inequality is Subdomain Stitching, the second inequality is Marginal Mechanism, the third inequality is immediate from the definition of D C A , and the equality is a consequence of
, where p i = 0 since p A > 0, so
is the expected number of items in their tails conditioned on item i being in its tail, so it is equal to 1 + j =i p j . Thus
We will use τ to denote the quantity
we can get a stronger bound for the welfare of the core if we don't immediately apply the inequality τ ≤ 1. We have
Before we proceed, one final lemma we will need later is: Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.6.
where the second inequality uses the fact that the Myerson revenue for Y is upper bounded by v.
A Tighter Bound for the Welfare of the Core
The main observation behind our improvement is that for τ to be large (and the above bound to be weak), the tail probabilities must be large. However, we will choose the price of the grand bundle, P t , to be at most 2, so that whenever 2 or more valuations lie in their tails, the customer is guaranteed to want to buy the bundle (and dispose of items for which her valuation is negative). Thus
where the inequality comes from the fact that the probability of x + i being less than the bundle price is greater conditioned on no items being in the tail, than conditioned on some item being in the tail. We used independence to compute the probabilities in the final expression, which we will bound in the following way:
Lemma 8.7. Let p 1 , . . . , p n , r 1 , . . . , r n be real numbers satisfying 0 ≤ p i ≤ r i and
This is the key inequality that enables our improved ratio and its proof requires new analysis. Note that we do indeed have the condition p i ≤ r i in our case, since by Lemma 8.4 r i ≥ p i Rev(D T i ), and Rev(D T i ) must be at least 1 when D T i is distributed over (1, ∞).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.7. We will first prove
Assume that p i < 1 for all i ∈ [n]; the lemma is trivially true otherwise because we would have LHS = 1 and τ = 0. Since τ = n i=1 p i (1 − r i ) and 1 − x ≤ e −x , it suffices to prove
(1 − p i (1 − r i ))
which is equivalent to
(1 + p i r i 1 − p i )
Observe that the RHS is at least
But p i ≤ r i for all i ∈ [n], so the LHS is at most n i=1 p 2 i (1 − p i ), which can be seen to be at most . [BB99, FN06, HN12, BILW14] ). However, since we are only interested in the lower tail, we can actually use Cantelli's one-sided inequality (Lemma 3.1), which optimizes a shift parameter to obtain an improved bound for a single tail. Now, note that
by definition. Also, it will be convenient to write the bundle price as P t = α · Val + (D C ∅ ), for some α ∈ [0, 1] (we would never want α > 1 since then the price would be greater than the mean and it would be impossible to use Cantelli). Then
where the first inequality is Cantelli's inequality, and the second inequality comes from our variance bound above. So long as we choose P t ≤ 2, we can use (11), and combined with Lemma 8.7 we get P[ x It is immediate that the optimal revenue from PC is 2ρ, attained by selling individual items at any price in [1, 2]. Next, we would like to argue that the optimal revenue from PB is also 2ρ. If we offer the bundle at 2, it is guaranteed to get bought if either valuation realizes to 2 or both valuations realize to a positive number, and won't get bought otherwise. Therefore the revenue is 2(ρ 2 + 2(1 − ρ) ρ 2 ) = 2ρ. We can do equally well by offering the bundle at 3, and any other price is inferior. a valuation uniform on [0,5] and independent from item 1. Most of the welfare comes from the lower-valuation item: the expected welfare for item 1 and item 2 are 0.5 and 0.025, respectively.
The optimal deterministic profit is ≈ 0.265, attained by offering item 1 at 0.51, item 2 at 4.83, and the bundle at the discounted price of 5.13.
The optimal BSP pricing charges 4.83 for a single item and 5.03 for both items, earning only 19% of the deterministic optimum. This example highlights the issue with BSP: it cannot afford to charge a low price for a single item if any item has a high production cost. However, most of the potential profit could be coming from offering lower-valuation items at low prices! [CLS08] bypass such examples in their numerical experiments, assuming that all items have a low cost compared to its mean valuation.
PBDC offers item 1 at 0.51, item 2 at 5.01, and the bundle at 5.01-which is the right idea and earns 99.1% of the deterministic optimum. Interestingly, even the analytical solution provided by [Bha13] , which computes the optimal deterministic pricing when there are two independent uniform distributions and costs, is less effective than PBDC on this example. The solution from [Bha13] only attains 97.5% of the deterministic optimum for this example, because it requires a bit of linear approximation.
Optimal bundling is an intricate problem even in the case of two independent uniform distributions, so a simple pricing heuristic as robust as PBDC is invaluable. In fact, for this example PBDC recommends Partial Mixed Bundling, which is a Mixed Bundling scheme where one of the items, in this case item 2 (the high-cost low-welfare item), is never sold individually. This matches the intuition that the seller should add item 1 (the low-cost high-welfare item) to item 2 in order to increase the total amount customer is willing to pay (see Proposition 1 in [Bha13] ). BSP, on the other hand, does not perform well: it recommends a Partial Mixed Bundling scheme where item 1 is never sold individually.
